Abstract: After 2008, European governments undertook austerity measures to come out of the global financial crisis. The policies were imposed to reduce the states' debts and deficits, increase their economic competitiveness, and restore business confidence. Inevitably, the results of their implementation were socially noticeable and triggered the occurrence of new social movements which became a powerful player on a political scene. In some states, the stakeholders of anti-austerity movements used physical political violence while in the other they settled for mental. The article introduces findings of the comparative study on the relationships between patterns of culture of political violence and intrastate, regional, and colonial explaining factors. By applying statistical analysis, it tests empirically Negussay Ayele's explanatory model of militant culture of political violence for a theory-verification purpose. As a result, it makes a contribution to the structure of explanation encompassing the particular configurations of indicators.
2015; Freire et al., 2014) , mechanisms of interests and ideas change into collective behavior (Saunders et al., 2015) , influence of social, political, and cultural conflict on movements' efficiency (della Porta, 2015; Guzman-Concha, 2015) , political economy-based interpretation of mass mobilization (Císař & Navrátil, 2017) , and channels of diffusion of the ideas which fuel anti-austerity protests (della Porta & Mattoni, 2015) . Those works enable us to comprehend the reasons of the movements occurrence, diffusion of their continuance idea in Europe, and to discern the specificity of political mobilization in times of austerity. Nevertheless, no research has been carried out on why the initially a priori peaceful anti-austerity movements deployed violence in a public sphere and why they did it in broadly-based ways despite shared goals and political values. Although it is known that attitudes toward its usage differed in the euro area, we do not know why Estonians preferred to sing their way through hardship, rather than fight like Belgians (Velmet, 2014) . Hence, not only is it not clear to what extent and how they differed in the paradigms of violent behavior but also what exactly contributed to their very nature and those differences (della Porta et al., 2017) .
First, the research is the first attempt to explain anti-austerity movement stakeholders' violent behavior in various state contexts. It covers all the Eurozone states where the movements acted. Second, for a theory-verification purpose, it tests Negussay Ayele's explanatory model projected originally to account for the occurrence of violent society in Ethiopia. As Ayele points out, if in the history of a state, intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators make an appearance, culture of political violence occurs in this state. Culture of political violence is understood by him broadly as the extensive use of physical violence in a political structure. In turn, the intrastate indicator is the element of political violence in the form of vicious struggles for the height of political power took up by aspirants of collective political subjects such as ethnic groups or inhabitants of geographical entities. The regional indicator is then characterized as a rivalry between regions. The last, colonial indicator is circumscribed as land colonization (Ayele, 2011, p. 216 -217) . The Ayele explanatory framework informs a null hypothesis to be tested. H0: There is probably no correlation between the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators occurrence and the time of their occurrence in the history of the state and the pattern of culture of political violence of the stakeholders of the anti-austerity movement in this state. The alternative hypothesis is: HA: If in the history of a state, the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators occur, the stakeholders of the anti-austerity movement in this state probably have militant culture of political violence but it loses its militant value over time and the more time intervenes from the occurrence of the indicators, the more peaceful culture of political violence becomes.
The statistical analysis method is employed to verify the theory-driven hypothesis. The Pearson correlation technique allows us to determine a type and strength of linear correlations between the explaining indicators and the indicator to be explained. There is also conducted a two-tail test to compute the statistical significance of the correlations (Sig. 2-tailed). A standard scale is accepted to assess statistical significance. The Pearson correlation is significant when the Sig. 2-tailed is at the 0,05 level or lower. It is not significant when the coefficient is at a level higher than 0,05.
Culture of political violence is defined for the research need as a paradigm of using political violence in a political structure, which is determined by temporal, subject, and subject matter indicators. A political structure is constituted by political subjects and relationships between them. Political violence is the intentional influencing by a political subject/-s the thinking process, behavior, or physical state of other political subject/-s, despite the lack of authority of the political subject under the influence, in order to achieve relevant political goals. The paradigm consists of five analytical planes: the political subjects that made use of political violence, the extent of cohesion between the legitimation to use political violence stemming from political roles and its actual usage and mutual acceptance of political subjects in political structures for using and controlling the use of political violence, the modes of the legitimation of the perpetration of political violence, the intensity of the use of physical political violence, and the means employed by political subjects to perpetrate political violence. A type of culture of political violence is a latent qualitative dependent variable which carries the three values of its patterns located on a simple ordinal scale: placid, hector-led, and militant. The placid type is aggressive narrowly, the hector-led -moderately, and the militant -sublimely.
The independent variables are: intrastate, regional, colonial, fixed set of thereof, configurations of thereof, and time from their occurrence to the first use of political violence by the stakeholders of anti-austerity movements. The process of verification of Ayele's model is organized into stages set according to a subject matter criterion. On each stage, it is checked if a particular explaining indicator originated in the history of a state, when it took place last time before or over a movement inception, and what was the time from the date of an indicator's last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by the stakeholders. Those involved factors will be determined detachedly for each state where the stakeholders acted.
The dates of the first use of political violence were established over the application of the theoretical framework of culture of political violence to the conceptual qualitative content analysis of the police reports and media discourse from 14 states from 2008 -2015 (302 articles and visual materials published in public, commercial, and social media collected according to the principle of theoretical sampling). They are: 2010 in Belgium, France, Ireland, Slovakia, and Italy; 2011 in Greece, Spain, and Portugal; 2012 in Austria, Estonia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Slovenia; and 2014 in Finland. As a result of analyzing the same data, it was determined that Estonia and Slovakia represented the placid pattern of culture of political violence; Austria, the Netherlands, and France -the hector-led; and Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland -the militant.
Intrastate Indicator and Cultures of Political Violence
This part of test addresses the first component of the Ayele model and strives to see to what extent a community of a revolutionary spirit survived in the Eurozone (Baumgarten, 2017; O'Kane, 2015; Horn & Kenney, 2004; Horn, 2007, p. 14) . Drawing on the secondary literature it was checked over if the intrastate indicator occurred in the 14 states. According to Ayele, the involved are the elements of political violence in the form of brute struggles for the height of political power by aspirants of collective political subjects such as ethnic groups or inhabitants of geographical entities (Ayele, 2011, p. 216) . The category of a collective political subject is too broad to be employed here to the empirical analysis directly unless the predicate "brute" is essential. The participation in political elections by a party politics, otherwise, would become the indicator. Hence, according to the exemplifications provided by Ayele, the occurrence of the intrastate indicator is corroborated if, in a given state, an ethnic group or inhabitants of a geographical entity follow their claim to rule by employing physical political violence. The point is to observe the endeavors made to change the relations between political subjects within the relation of public power. Intervention in politics is not just opposition to ruling elites but is organized to take their place. To put it in a more general statement, if a collective political subject applies physical political violence to pursue its claim to rule, the emergence of the intrastate indicator in a given state is confirmed.
The intrastate indicator occurred in 13 from among 14 states. It did not make an appearance in Slovenia where obstreperously-militant culture of political violence emerged in contrary to the remaining states typified with this pattern of culture of political violence. In the states with the placid type, the manifestations of the intrastate indicator were the following: Estonia -the 1924 Estonian coup d'état attempt and Slovakia -the 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état. The time from the date of the intrastate indicators last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by the stakeholders of the anti-austerity movements was 88 years in Estonia and 62 in Slovakia.
When the cases of the hector-led type are concerned, the intrastate indicator took the forms of the July Putsch in Austria (1934) , the Troelstra mistake in the Netherlands (1918) , and the Generals' putsch in France (1961) . The time from the date of the intrastate indicators last appearance to the date of the first use of political violence was: 78 years in Austria, 94 in the Netherlands, and 49 in France.
The intrastate indicator was identified in the variety of shapes also in the states of the militant pattern. They were the Pyjamas Coup in Greece (1975) , the 23-F in Spain (1981) , the Mäntsälä rebellion in Finland (1932) , the Easter Rebellion in Ireland (1916) , the failure of the members of the German resistance to assassinate Adolf Hitler and seize control in Germany (1944) , the organization by the Armed Forces Movement the Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1974) , the Belgian Revolution in Belgium in 1830, and the Golpe Borghese in Italy (1970) . The time from the date of the intrastate indicators last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by the stakeholders was: 36 years in Greece, 30 in Spain, 82 in Finland, 94 in Ireland, 68 in Germany, 37 in Portugal, 180 in Belgium, and 40 in Italy.
Actually, the explanatory indicator characterizes most of the states in the world and is of low explanatory power. The simple co-occurrence avoids providing any compelling explanation. Checking it for the dates of occurrence failed to increase the model's value. Generally speaking, no regularity has been identified between the intrastate indicators and the cultures of political violence. The Pearson correlation between a type of culture of political violence and the occurrence of the intrastate indicator coefficient equals 0,189, indicating a small positive linear correlation and points out that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0,517 which is considerably higher than 0,05. Noticeably, there is no statistically significant correlation between the explaining indicator and the indicator to be accounted for at the 0,05 level.
In the case of the placid cultures of political violence, the time intrastate indicator values range from 62 to 88. Then, the ends of the continuum of the hector-led pattern are 49 and 94. When the militant type is discussed, the values range from 30 to 180. The exemplifications of the last pattern took both the lowest and the highest values. Among the hector-led cases, there is the state which has a lower value than the states classified as the placid. In turn, the placid one assumes a higher value than one of the hector-led. Strictly speaking, no regularity has been observed in the data concerning the time factor. The correlation between a type of culture of political violence and the time intrastate indicator coefficient equals -0,043, indicating a very small correlation and states that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0,889 which is tremendously higher than 0,05. A statistically significant correlation does not exist between the variables at the 0,05 level. Furthermore, the coefficient is counted for 13 out of 14 cases because the intrastate indicator did not enter Slovenia, which reduces the meaning of the indicator even more so.
Regional Indicator and Cultures of Political Violence
The regional explanatory indicator of the Ayele model is defined as a rivalry between the regions (Ayele, 2011, p. 216 -217) . When a rivalry between regions constituting a given state asserts itself, the occurrence of the regional indicator is confirmed. The rivalry meeting the critical criterion existed in 4 out of 14 cases: Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and Italy. In Spain, the rivalry between Catalonia and the other regions was present over the Spanish anti-austerity movement continuance (2011). The Irish movement co-occurred with the rivalry between Irish republican and Ulster loyalties (2010) . Similarly, when the Belgian movement acted, the rivalry between the Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels-Capital Region entered Belgium (2010). All the Italian regions rivaled in the state when the Italian movement functioned (2010). The time from the date of the regional indicators last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by the stakeholders of the anti-austerity movement was zero in years, in each case.
The stakeholders in Belgium and Italy epitomized obstreperously-militant culture of political violence, whereas the Spanish and Irish formed an aggressively-militant type. The explanatory indicator indeed co-occurred there and only there, which is symptomatic. It originated in 28,57% of the cases. In the other states, where the militant pattern emerged, Finland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Greece, regional rivalries were not observed. Although the regional indicator is of high value to the militant pattern, its meaning and explanatory potential cannot be overstated due to its absence in the history of the other states. Its role as a part of the explanatory framework is, therefore, inconsiderable. Importantly, however, the regional indicator did not co-occur with the placid and the hector-led types. It means that more probable is that if a regional rivalry exists in a state, militant culture of political violence will originate, rather than the placid or the hector-led. More likely is also that if the rivalry does not emerge, the placid or the hector-led will make an appearance. Nevertheless, an extent of probability is not very high just because of the flaws.
The Pearson correlation between a type of culture of political violence and the occurrence of the regional indicator coefficient equals -0,432, indicating a medium negative linear correlation and shows that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0,123 which is strikingly higher than 0,05. As the results demonstrate, there is no statistically significant correlation at the 0,05 level.
Colonial Indicator and Cultures of Political Violence
The colonial indicator is circumscribed simply as land colonization (Ayele, 2011, p. 217 -218) . For the sake of clarity, it is of relevance to capture if the territory of a given state was colonized, rather than if a state was a colonizer. The meaning taken in order to test the explanatory framework comes directly from Ayele's theory. It should not be, therefore, confused with the other types of relations between an empire and territories ancillary (Loomba, 2005, p. 12) . The simplest approach of a colonizing Europe and a colonized Africa and Asia from the 16 th century onwards is jettisoned as obscuring the details of colonial history and the experience of people in colonies (Cooper, 2005, p. 3 -4) . Not adopted is also the questionable assumption that a colony ought to be an overseas territory of a colonizer. The predicate "overseas" is therefore not recognized as a distinctive feature of colonies in the review of the history of the states (Steinmetz, 2014, p. 79 -80) . Instead, the institution of a colony in one territory by a ruling political subject from another territory, and the subsequent perpetuation, expansion, and exploitation of that colony are of colonialism nature. The act of the institution manufactures a set of unequal relationships between the colonial center and the colony and, thereby, also between the colonists and the indigenous peoples. The colony is formed by a group of people who leave their native state to create in a new land a settlement subject to, or connected with, the parent nation.
In the history of European states, colonialism was usually one of the types of dependency relations between territories, which emerged over time (Steinmetz, 2014, p. 77) . Their appearance had either a concealed or overt form. Despite the considerable moderation of the criteria of the colonial indicator distinction, its occurrence was identified only in 3 out of 14 cases that is 21,43% of the entities. It emerged in all the states with the placid pattern, i.e., in Estonia and Slovakia in 1989. Furthermore, in both cases, it took the form of Soviet colonialism, the occupation of the territories that later developed into a colonial rule. Surprisingly, the time from the date of the colonial indicators last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by the stakeholders was the same in both states and totaled exactly 21 years. The colonial indicator entered also Ireland but the time was equal to 79 years. It was the Statute of Westminster 1931, which stopped the colonialism. In Ireland, in contrast to Estonia and Slovakia, the aggressively-militant pattern elicited. Only 1 from among 9 states with the militant type assigned was the colony. Furthermore, the colonial indicator did not enter the states where the hector-led type originated.
The Pearson correlation between a type of culture of political violence and the appearance of the colonial indicator coefficient equals 0,595, indicating a strong positive linear correlation and points out that the coefficient is significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0,025 which is strikingly lower than 0,05. It reveals a statistically significant correlation at the 0,05 level. Its meaning should not be, however, overestimated for the explanatory framework. As a matter of fact, despite the theoretical assumption made clearly by Ayele, the colonial indicator typifies, in general, the more peaceful patterns of culture of political violence.
On the one hand, the co-occurrence of the elements of the explanatory framework is indisputable when strictly and only the placid patterns are consulted. On the other hand, the model should be tested in this scope by working with further examples to verify if the relations between indicators are not casual deceptively. This reservation is put forward just because no regularity has been identified in the other cases. Actually, unlike with the Ayele assumption, the colonial indicator did not precede those cultures of political violence which were based on the use of physical political violence. Ireland, representing the militant pattern, was the only exception to this statement but the model in its current form does not introduce its potential derivation. Ultimately, though it cannot be foreclosed that the colonial explanatory indicator comes in handy to account for the placid type, the model is of relatively low explanatory power to deal with the question of the cultures of political violence.
Little do the facts of simple occurrence explain here. It would be therefore advisable to delve deeper into the very nature of the indicator. The history of colonization is worth scrutinizing in terms of how many times a given state has been colonized, how long it was a colony, what was the proceedings of the dependency relation, and how exactly the relation ended. Not less beneficial may be to examine the history of European social movements and the rhetoric of the new capitalism as a "new colonial" power (Sartre, 2001, p. 102) . Finally, it would be also desirable to check whether a state has been in some other dependency relations and if so, what are or were the essential features. Note should be taken that much more time passed from the date of the colonial indicators last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by the stakeholders of the anti-austerity movement in the case of the militant type than the placid. It suggests that in the former colonies which lost their colonial status a shorter time ago it is more likely that the placid pattern will occur than in those which lost it a longer time ago.
Toward Explanation
Ayele argues for employing the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators as a fixed explanatory set (Ayele, 2011, p. 216 -217) . Nevertheless, all the explanatory indicators occurred merely in the case of Ireland, that is 7,14% of the cases. It means that the model as a whole has not provided a researcher with a possibility to explain and compare the sources of cultures of political violence in all the states under scrutiny. The Pearson correlation between a type of culture of political violence and the full Ayele model coefficient equals -0,189, indicating a small negative linear correlation and shows that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0,517 which is measurably higher than 0,05. It means that the correlation is not statistically significant at the 0,05 level, in contrast to the assumption made in the Ayele theory. The test of significance does not allow us to disprove the null hypothesis at the 0,05 level. Thereby, there is no significant correlation between the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators occurrence and the time of their occurrence in the history of the state and the cultures of political violence of the stakeholders of the anti-austerity movement in this state. It means that the alternative hypothesis cannot be assumed. Overall, the model has proved rather useless to approach all the cases. The process of Ayele's framework verification fails to come across with arguments for considering the straightforward involvement of the indicators to the explanatory model under construction. Nonetheless, it informs efficiently the explanatory model which approaches the indicators in specific configurations.
Indeed, much more useful is to take the components of the explanatory set as the elements of an array of diverse models, which may emerge in various configurations and thus create diverse models (an independent variable). Stronger is a relationship between the configurations of the sets of the explanatory indicators and cultures of political violence than the one between the individual explanatory indicators and the patterns of culture of political violence. The Pearson correlation between a type of culture of political violence and the configuration of the intrastate, regional, and colonial explanatory indicators coefficient equals 0,651, indicating a strong positive linear correlation and indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0,012 which is substantially lower than 0,05. It reveals notably a statistically significant correlation at the 0,05 level. Noteworthy, the configurations of the explanatory indicators show that only and all the cases with placid type are typified with the occurrence of the intrastate and colonial indicators configuration. All the hector-led cases, but not only they, are marked with the intrastate indicator. More diversified are the explanatory frameworks of the militant pattern. The mildest militant culture of political violence, the indulgingly-militant, in Finland, shares the explanatory model with the hector-led type. The moderately militant pattern, the obstreperously-militant, in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, has broadly-based explaining sets. They are the intrastate and regional indicators model (Belgium and Italy) and the intrastate indicator model (Portugal and Germany). The framework is not useful to explain the culture of political violence in Slovenia. The sets of the explanatory indicators of the most thuggish pattern, the aggressively-militant, in Greece, Spain, and Ireland, were fully diversified. They were: the intrastate indicator model, the intrastate and regional indicators, and the intrastate, colonial, and regional indicators, respectively.
Conclusion
The fixed set of the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators is not applicable to account for the diversity of cultures of political violence because there is no significant statistical correlation between the variables at the 0,05 level. In fact, it entered just one empirical case -Ireland. Nevertheless, the Ayele proposal has an explanatory potential. Even though it is not meaningful if all the indicators occur in a state, it matters in what configuration they emerge. Furthermore, it may be of high importance to delve analytically into the structures of the configurations of the indicators which are symptomatic to particular cultures of political violence. The proceedings and results of the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators manifestations are worth taking into consideration. The frequency and intensity of the events may be also relevant. The point is, however, to determine precisely a conceptual framework which would be applicable to approach systematically what and how contributes to the paradigms of the use of political violence and the differences between them.
